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Pierre I<lossowski
Parody and polytheism in Nietzsche? At first sight, it is not at
all clear what relation exists between these two terms, nor
what kind oE concerns would lead one to speak oE them, nor
what interest one n1ight have in raising such a question. If for
most people Nietzsche's name is inseparable from the
utterance God is dead, then it may seem surprising to speak of
the religion of many gods with regard to Nietzsche. After all,
there are countless people today for whom Nietzsche's name
signifies nothing more than this utterance-and they did not
need Nietzsche to know that all the gods are dead. It mayaiso
seem, perhaps, that I am simply using Nietzsche to
demonstrate the existence of many gods and to legitimate
polytheism; and, by playing on these words, I will not escape
the reproach, under the pretext of showing the meaning of
parody in Nietzsche, of making a parody of myself and thus
of parodying Nietzsche.
If I must open myself to such confusion, I would
nevertheless like to make one thing clear: insofar as one is
lead to interpret the thought of a mind [eprit] that one tries
to comprehend and make comprehensible, there is no one
who leads his interpreter to parody him as much as Nietzsche.
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This is true not only of those interpreters who are smitten
with his thought, but also those who try hard to refute him as
a dangerous spirit. Nietzsche himself urged one of his first
interpreters-no one had yet spoken of hirn-to abandon
all pathos, not to take sides in his favor, and to put up a sort
of ironic resistance when characterizing him.
Here, then, we cannot avoid being the victim of a
sort of ruse, nor can we avoid falling into the trap inherent in
Nietzsche's own experience and thought. Unless we simply
undertake the work of the historian, as Andler did, l the
moment we try to elucidate Nietzsche's thought, he is always
made to say more than he says and less than he says. This is
not-as is often the case with other thinkers--due to a simple
lack of perspective or even because a determinate point of
departure has been omitted. In assimilating Nietzsche, we
make him say more than he says, while in rejecting or altering
him, we make rum say less than he says-for the simple reason
that, properly speaking, with Nietzsche there is hardly either
a point of departure or a precise terminus. Nietzsche's
contemporaries and friends were able to follow an evolution
from The Birth of Tragedy to The Wanderer and His Shadow and
on to The Gqy Science) and from Zarathustra to The Twilight of
the Idols. But those of us who have at our disposal the youthful
writings as weil as the posthumous work, including Ecce Homo,
have not only been able to follow the ramifications of
Nietzsche's posterity, and to witness the accusations made
against Nietzsche as a result of recent historical upheavals,
but have also been able to discern something which, I think,
is not without importance: Nietzsche, who was despite
everything a professor of philology at Basel, and thus an
academic with absolutely certain pedagogical ambitions, did
not develop a philosophy. Instead, outside of the framework
of the university, Nietzsche developed variations on a personal
then1e. Living a simple life marked by extreme suffering and
convalescence, forced to sojourn with increasing frequency
at health resorts, while in the midst of the greatest intellectual
isolation, Nietzsche was thereby abandoned, in the most
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auspicious manner, to listen to himself alone [d sa seule audition].
This academic, trained in the disciplines of science in
order to teach and train others, found himself compeiled to
teach the unteachable. What is unteachable are those moments
when existence, escaping from the delimitations that produce
the notions of history and morality, as weil as the practical
behavior derived from them, is shown to be given back to
itself with no other goal than that of returning to itself. All
things then appear at once new and quite old; everything is
possible and everything is immediately impossible; and there
are only two courses open to consciousness: either to keep
silent, or to speak; either to do nothing, or to act so as to
imprint on one's everyday quotidian ambiance the character
of existence given back to itself; either to lose itself in existence
or to reproduce it.
Nietzsche had immediately attained this unteachable
in his own solitude, through his own idiosyncrasies-that is,
by descnbing himse!fas a convalescent who had suffered from
the unresolvecl nihilism of his own era and who had resolved
this nihilism, to the point where he was able to restore to the
notion of fatum its fuil force. He had grasped the very ground
of existence, lived as fortuitous-that is, he had grasped that
aspect of existence which, through hirn, was fortuitously
named Nietzsche. In this way, he had also grasped the necessity
of accepting this fortuitous situation as his own destiny (in
the sense he ascribes to this word), which amounts to a
decision to affirm the existence of a universe that has no
other end than that of being what it iso
Nietzsche recognized this apprehension of
existence-which is nothing other than the apprehension of
eternity-in the simulacra of art and religion, but he also saw
that this n10de of apprehension is perpetually denied by
scientific activity, which explores existence through its tangible
forms in order to construct a practicable and livable world.
Nonetheless, Nietzsche feIt a solidarity with both these
attitudes toward existence: that of simulacra, as weil as that
of science, which declares fiat ventaspereat vita.2
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Andso heput simulacra into seienee andsaenee into simulacra:
in sueh a wqy that the seientist ean sqy: ''Qualis artifexpereo!'3
Nietzsehe was prey to an inelucidable revelation of
existence that did not know how to express itself except
through song and image. A struggle was being waged within
him between the poet and the scholar, between the visionary
and the moralist, each of which was trying to disqualify the
role of the other. This struggle was provoked by a feeling of
moral responsibility toward his contemporaries. The different
tendencies, the different attitudes that were fighting over
Nietzsche's consciousness would endure until a crucial event
was produced: Nietzsehe would be externalized in a character,
a veritable dramatis persona: Zarathustra-a character who is
not only the product of a fictive redoubling, but is in some
way achallenge by Nietzsehe the visionary to Nietzsehe the
professor and man of letters. The character of Zarathustra
has a complex function: on the one hand, he is the Christ, as
Nietzsehe secretly and jealously understands him; but on the
other hand, insofar as he is the Accuser of the traditional
Christ, he is the one who prepares the way for the advent of
Dionysus philosophos.
The years during which Thus Spoke Zarathustra was
fashioned, and especially those that followed its birth, were
for Nietzsehe astate of unparalleled distress:
One pays dearly for immortality: one has to
die several times while still alive. There is
something that I call the rancor of what is
great: everything great-a work, a deed-is
no sooner accomplished than it turns against
the man who clid it. By doing it, he has become
weak; he no longer endures his deed, he can
no longer face it. Something one was never
permitted to will lies behind one, something in
which the knot in the destiny of humanity is
tied-and now one labors underitI-It almost
crushes one...4
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Zarathustra, to be sure, was latent in the previous
works, but what is important for Nietzsche's life is not only
the creation and presence of the ineffable songs of the poem.
What came to be determinant for Nietzsche's life was the
more or less complete identification of Nietzsche with this
physiognorny, which for him constituted a kind of promise, a
resurrection, an ascension. In a certain sense, Zarathustra is
the star of which Nietzsche hirnself is only the satellite. Even
better, I would say that Nietzsche, after having paved the way
for the triumph of Zarathustra, remains behind in a position
sacrificed in the course of a victorious retreat. As he hirnself
said, he would pay dearly for this creation. Zarathustra
prefigures Nietzsche's own immortality-that immortality by
which one dies more than once while still alive. When Nietzsche
managed to separate Zarathustra from hirnself, and was
therebyable to encounter him as a superior but still inaccessible
reality, then the world of appearances-which, according to
the divine fable, was created in six days-disappeared along
with the true world; for in six days the true world became a
fable once again. Nietzsche casts a retrospective glance at this
re-fabulation of the true world that disappears in six days, or
six periods, which are the inverse of the six days of the world's
creation. It is this re-fabulation that he traces out in an
aphorism of The Twilight of the Idols entitled "How the True
World' Final!J Became a Fable."
Here is the passage:
1. The true world-attainable for the
sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in
it, he is it. (The oldest form of the idea... a
circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am
the truth.")
2. The true world-unattainable for
now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the
virtuous man, "for the sinner who repents."
(progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle,
insidious, incomprehensible ... it becomes
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Christian.)
3. The true world-unattainable,
indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very
thought of it-a consolation, an obligation,
as an imperative. (At bottom, the old sun, but
seen through mist and skepticism. The idea
has become elusive, pale, Nordic,
Königsbergian.)
4. The true world-unattainable? At
any rate, unattained. And being unattained,
also unknown. Consequently, not consoling,
redeeming, or obligating: how could
something unknown obligate us? (Gray
morning. The first yawn of reason. The
cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The true world-an idea which is
no longer good for anything, not even
obligating-an idea that has become useless
and superfluous-consequentlJ, a refuted idea:
let us abolish it! (Bright day... return of bon
sens and gaiety: Plato's embarrassed blush;
pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world-we have abolished.
What world has remained? The apparent one
perhaps? But not With the true world we have
abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of
tl1e shortest shadow; end of the longest error:
Incipit Zarathustra.~5
With the true world, we have abolished the apparent
world. When the true world (the Platonie, Christian, spiritualist,
idealist, transcendental world) that serves as the point of
reference for the apparent world clisappears, then the apparent
world clisappears as weIl. The apparent world cannot become
the real world of scientific positivism: the world becomes a
fable, the world as such is only a fable. "Fable" means
something that is narrated, and that exists only in its narration.
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The world is something that is narrated, a narrated event, and
hence an interpretation. Religion, art, scienee, and history are
so many diverse interpretations of the world, or rather, so
many variants of the fable.
Is this to say that we are dealing here with a universal
illusionism? Not at alle The fable, I said, is an event that is
narrated; it happens, or rather, it must make something
happen; and in effeet an action takes plaee and narrates itself;
but if we are not content to listen and follow, if we seek to
apprehend the narration in order to discern whether behind
the recitation there is not some moment that differs from what we
understand in the narration, then everything is interrupted-
and onee again, there is a true world and an apparent world.
We have seen how the true world and the apparent world
have become a fable, but this is not the first time. There is
something in Nietzsche's text that warrants mention: midday,
hour of the shortest shadow. After midday, everything begins
again, including the ancient world, that is to say, the past
interpretations. In antiquity, the hour of midday was an hour
at once lueky and ill-fated ffaste et nifaste] , not only an hour in
which all activity was suspended under the blinding light of
the sun, but also an hour of forbidden visions, followed by
delirium. After midday, the day declines into shadows; but
through these shadows, we will be guided to profound
midnight by Zarathustra, the master of the fable.
Fable, fabula, comes from the Latin verb fan, which
means both "to predict" and "to rave" r,predire et divagueij, to
prediet fate and to rave;fatum} fate, is also the past partieiple
offari.
Thus when we say that the world has become fable,
we are also saying that it is afatum; one raves, but in raving one
foretells and predicts fate. We emphasize these connotations
here beeause of the role that fatality-the erucial notion of
fatum-plays in Nietzsche's thought. The re-fabulation of the
world also means that the world exits historical time in order
to reenter the time oE myth, that is, eternity. Or rather, it
means that the vision oE the world is an apprehension oE
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eternity. Nietzsche saw that the mental conditions for such
an "exit" [sorlie] lay in the forgetting (of the historical situation)
that was preliminary to the act of creating: in forgetting, the
past is remembered [sous-vient a] by humans as their future,
which takes the ftgure of the past.6 It is in this way that the past
comes to [advien~ them in what they create; for what they believe
they create in this way does not come to them from the
present, but is only the pronunciation of a prior possibility in
the momentary forgetting of the (historically determined)
present.
Zarathustra's mission is to give a new meaning and a
new will to men in a world that he is necessarily going to
recreate. But since every created world risks losing its meaning
and becoming fabulous and divine once again, and since it
may be rejected and seem intolerable to men now that they
have come to will nothing rather than something, Zarathustra
must reveal to them the true way, which is not a straight path
but a tortuous one:
For here is all my creating and striving} that I create
andcarry together into one what isfragment and riddle
and dreadful chance.7
Along with the true world, we have abolished the
apparent world-along with the preoccupation with truth,
we have liquidated the explanation of appearances.
(" 'Explanation' is what we call ilj but it is 'description' that distinguishes
us from older stages of knowledge and science. Gur descriptions are
better--but we do not explain any more than ourpredecessors."~ All
this is full of consequence, for if the thought of having
abolished the apparent world along with the true world is not
a simple quip, it gives an account of what was happening in
Nietzsche himself. He had given notice to the world in which
he still carried the name of "Nietzsche" (and if he continued
to write under this name, it was in order to save appearances):
everything has cllanged and nothing has changed. It is better
to let those wl~o act believe they are changing something.
Does not Nietzsche say that these people are not, in fact,
men of action, but rather contemplatives who put a price on
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things-and that men of action act only by virtue oE this
appreciation by the contemplatives?
But this suppression of the apparent world, with its
reference to the true world, finds expression in a long process
that can be followed only if we take into account the
coexistence, within Nietzsehe, of the scientist and the
moralist-or more essentially, the psychologist and the
visionary. Two different terrninologies result from this, which,
in their perpetual interference, form an inescapable web. In
the end, the lucidity of the psychologist, the destroyer of
images, will simply be put to work by the poet, and thus for
the fable. In his attempt to scrutinize the lived experience of
the poet-the sleepwalker of the day-the psychologist would
discover regions in which he himself was dreaming out loud.
This analysis of the psychologist, before he was
invaded by the dreams and visions he tried to avoid, allows us
to see succinctly how, in the name of the rational principles
of positivism, Nietzsehe winds up ruining not only the rational
concept of truth but also the concept of conscious thought,
including the operations of the intellect; and how, on the other
hand, this depreciation of conscious thought leads Nietzsehe
to question the validity of any communicability through
language; and we can see more clearly how this analysis-
which reduces rational thought to impulsive forces, but which
attributes to these impulsive forces the quality of authentie
existence-leads to a suppression of the limits between the
outside and the inside, a suppression of the limits between
existence individuated here and now and existence returning to itse!!
within the person of the philosopher. What presides over
this disintegration of concepts-for obviously something
n1ust subsist-is always the intensity of the mind which has
been excited to a supreme degree of insomnia; a sustained
perspicacity that drives to despair the demand for integrity, a
perspicacity whose rigor goes so far as to want to be liberated
from these functions of thought as if from a final servitude,
a final link with what Nietzsehe called "the spirit of gravity."
The analysis of consciousness that Nietzsehe gives in
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various aphorisms of The Gay Science may be summarized in
the following observations:
1. Conseiousness was the latest funetion to develop
in the evolution of organie life; it is also the most fragile
funetion, and eonsequently, the most dangerous one. If
humanity had beeome eonseious all at onee, as it has been
believed, it would have perished a long time ago. The proof
of this lies in the great number of false steps that
conseiousness has provoked in the life of the speeies, and
that it continues to provoke in the live of individuals, insofar
as it creates a disequilibrium in their impulses.
2. This undesirable function (undesirable because it
corresponds to an incompatible aspiration, the aspiration to
truth) undergoes an initial adaptation to other impulsive forces;
for a time, eonseiousness is linked to the life-conserving
instinet; and then one forms the fallacious notion of a
conseiousness that is stable, eternal, immutable and,
consequently, free and responsible. Because of this
overestin1ation of conseiousness, its over-hasty elaboration
has been avoided. Prom this arises the notion of substance.
3. The mental operations that this (opportunely
retarded) eonsciousness develops in its elaboration-these
operations that eonstitute logieal reason and rational
knowledge-are merely the produets of this compromise
between the impulsive life and eonseiousness. From what is
logie born? Obviously from the illogieality whose domain was
originally immense. At this stage, aeeording to Nietzsehe's
positivist description, logic becomes the strongest weapon
of the impulses, particularly for those beings in which
aggressiveness is translated into affirmation or negation, while
illogicality remains the domain of the weakest impulses.
Opportunely retarded in its own development, consciousness
(as false consciousness) develops conscious thought out of
the need to communicate through language. Such is the origin
of the most subtle operations that constitute logical reason
and rational knowledge.
At bottom, every high degree of caution in
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making inferences and every skeptical
tendency constitute a great danger for life. No
living beings would have survived if the
opposite tendency-to affirn1 rather than
suspend judgment, to err and make up things
rather than wait, to assent rather than negate,
to pass judgment rather than be just-had not
been bred to the point where it became
extraordinarily strong.9
4. Consciousness, as a threatening function because
of its anti-vital aspiration, therefore fmds itself momentarily
in retreat. In the relationship of knowledge, however, this
dangerous power is manifested anew in its true light. Logical
reason, constructed by the impulses in the course of this
combat with the anti-vital tendency of consciousness,
engenders habits of thinking which the still-maladapted
tendency of consciousness is led to detect as errors. These
errors-which are precisely those that make life possible, and
which Nietzsehe will later recognize as forms for the
apprehension of existence-always observe the same rules
of the game: namely, that there are durable things; that objects,
materials, and bodies exist; that a thing is what it appears to
be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is good in an
intrinsic manner-ingrained propositions that have become
the norms in accordance with which logical reason establishes
the true and the non-true. "It was only very late," says
Nietzsche, "that truth emerged-as the weakest form of
knowledge. It seemed that one was unable to live with it: our
organism was prepared for the opposite."10 Hence, Nietzsche
remarks, the strength of different sorts of knowledge does
not reside in their degree of truth, but in their degree of
antiquity, their degree of incorporation, their character as
conditions forelife. Nietzsche here cites the example of the
Eleatics, who wanted to put our sensible perceptions in doubt.
The Eleatics, he says, believed it was possible to live the
antinomies of the natural errors. But in order both to aJftrm
the antinomy and to live it, they invented the sage, a person who
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was both impersonal and unchangeable, and thus they fell
into illusion CI am still citing Nietzsche). Unable to abstract
from their own human condition, misunderstanding the nature
of the knowing subject, and denying the violence of the
impulses in knowledge, the Eleatics, in an absolute fashion,
believed they could conceive of reason as a perfectly free
activity. Probity and skepticism, those dangerous
manifestations of consciousness, were able to develop in ever
more subtle ways at the moment when these two contradictory
propositions appeared to be applicable to life because both
were compatible with fundamental errors-the moment it
became possible to dispute about their greater or lesser degree
of utility for life. Likewise, other new propositions, while not
useful to life, were nonetheless not harmful to life because
they were simply expressions in an intellectual game; and
consequently, they bore witness to the innocent and fortunate
character of every game. At that moment, the act of knowing
and the aspiration to the true were finally integrated as one
need among other needs. Not only belief or conviction, but
also examination, negation, mistrust, or contradiction
constituted a power [une puissance] , such tl'lat even the bad
instincts were subordinated and placed in the service of
knowledge, and acquired the prestige of what is licit, venerated,
and useful-and ultimately the look and innocence of the
Good. Nietzsche thereby comes to this first conclusion on
the precise situation of the philosopher:
The thinker is now that being in whom the impulse to
truth and those liJe-preserving errors clash for their
firstfight, after the impulsefor truth hasproved to be
also a liJe-preservingpower.11
The impulse to truth is a life-conserving power? But
here this is only a hypothesis, a momentary concession. In
fact, Nietzsehe concludes with a question: "To what extent can
truth endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the
experiment to be performed [/'expenence cl faire]."12
Nietzsche himself will carry this experiment to its
conclusion. When Nietzsehe evoked the exampIe of the
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Eleatics as an attempt to live the natural antinomies-an
attempt that required the impossible in1personality of the
philosopher in order to succeed-it was his own experience
that he was projecting into the paste The Eleatics, said
Nietzsche, invented the figure of the impersonal and
immutable sage as being both One and All. In so doing, they
fell into illusion, Nietzsche declares, because they remained
unaware of the violence of the impulses in the knowing subject.
But if Nietzsehe, in this judgment against the Eleatics, presents
himself as the person in whom this illusory experience has
been brought to consciousness, it is precisely because he
himself, obscurely, aspires to be both One and All, as if he
now saw the secret of the experiment in areturn of consciousness
to the unconsciousJ and 0/ the unconscious to consciousness-so
completely and so well that, at the end as at the beginning, it
would seem that the true world exists nowhere else than in
the sage.
Here, we must immediately distinguish between the
experiment to be performed and the lived experience
[l'experience dfaire et l'experience vecue], between the sufJering and
the willing.
In effect, we would like to know if the lived
experience-Nietzsche's specific experience, the ecstasy of
the eternal return in which the ego would suddenly find itself
to be both One and All, One and Multiple-could be made
the object of a demonstration, and thus constitute the point
of departure for a moral teaching.
But we must confine ourselves here to the question
we posed earlier: Could the philosopher have knowledge of a
state in which he would be both One and All, one and multiple,
given the fact that he will always ascribe more and more
consciousness to his pathos?
In other words: How could he possess his pathos
knowingly insofar as the pathos would be an apprehension
of existence returning upon itself?
In aphorisn1 333 of The Gqy Science, Nietzsche provides
a commentary on one of Spinoza's propositions that takes us
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to the heart of this problem:
The meaning of knowing.- Non ndere} non lugere}
neque detestan} sed intelligere! says Spinoza as
simply and sublimely as is his wont. Yet in the
last analysis, what else is this intelligere than the
form in which we come to feel the other three
at once? One result of the different and
mutually opposed impulses to laugh, lament,
and curse? Before knowledge is possible, each
of these impulses must first have presented
its one-sided view of the thing or the event;
after this comes the fight between these one-
sided views, and occasionally this results in a
mean, one grows calm, one finds all three sides
right, and there is a kind of justice and a
contract; for by virtue of justice and a contract
all these instincts can maintain their existence
and assert their rights against each other. Since
only the last scenes of reconciliation and the
final accounting at the end of this long process
rise to our consciousness, we suppose that
intelligere must be something conciliatory, just,
and good-something that stands essentially
opposed to the instincts, while it is actually
nothing but a certain behaviorof the instincts toward
one another.
For the longest time, conscious
thought was considered thought itself. Orlly
now does the truth dawn on us that by far the
greatest part of our spirit's activity remains
unconscious and unfelt. But I suppose that
these instincts which are here contending
against one another understand very wen how
to make themselves feIt by, and how to hurt,
one another. This may wen be the source of that
sudden and violent exhaustion that afflicts an
thinkers (it is tl1e exhaustion on a battlefield).
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Indeed, there may he occasions of concealed
heroism in our warring depths, but certainly
nothing divine that eternally rests in itself, as
Spinoza supposed. Conscious thinking,
especially that of the philosopher, is the least
vigorous and therefore also the relatively
mildest and calmest form of thinking; and thus
precisely philosophers are most apt to be led
astray about the nature of knowledge.
In this very beautiful passage, I suspect that Nietzsche
has defined, in a negative manner, his own mode of
comprehending and knowing: ndere} lugere} detestan Oaughing,
crying, hating) are three ways of apprehending existence. But
what is a science that laughs, or cries, or detests? A pathetic
knowledge? Our pathos knows, but we are never able to share
its mode of knowing. For Nietzsche, every intellectual act
corresponds to variations of astate of humor. Now, to
attribute a character of absolute value to pathos ruins, in a
single hlow, the notion that knowledge is impartial, since it
was only from an acquired degree of in1partiality that one
called into dO~Lht that same impartiality. This ingratitude is
the inverse of knowledge, which is disavowed as soon as it
makes us comprehend that we cannot know-an ingratitude
that will give birth to a new impartiality, hut within an absolute
partiality: For if logical conclusions are nothing hut the conflict
among the impulses that can only end in something unjust, to
aspire to more partialitywould be to observe the highest justice.
If the thinker, as Nietzsche says, is the being in whom
the impulse to truth and the life-preserving errors live and
struggle together, and if the question is knowing to what extent
truth can bear incorporation-if that is the experiment that
must now be performed-then let us now try to see in what
sense pathos is capable of this incorporation as an
apprehension of existence. Now that the intellectual act has
been devalorized-since it only takes place at the price of a
supreme exhaustion-why not admit hilarity as much as
seriousness as an organ of knowledge, for example, or anger
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,as much as serenity? Once seriousness is admitted to be a
state as doubtfl.ll as hatred or even love, why could not hilarity
be as valid and obvious an apprehension of existence as
seriousness?
The act of knowing, judging, or concluding is nothing
but the result of a certain behavior of the impulses toward
each other. Moreover, conscious thought-especially the
thought of the philosopher-is most often the expression
of a fall, adepression provoked by a terrible quarrel between
two or three contradictory impulses that results in something
unjust in itself. Does this mean that the philosopher (or the
thinker or the sage, in the Nietzschean sense) should give
himself over to a similarly contradictory behavior among the
impulses? Or that he should never speak except in statements
that participate in two or three simultaneous impulses, thereby
giving an account of existence apprehended through these
two or three impulses?
If the act of comprehending something is at this point
suspect-since it never reaches a conclusion except by
eliminating one of the impulses that has, in varying degrees,
contributed to its formation-and if comprehending is
nothing other than a precarious armistice between obscure
forces, then, out of this concern for integrity that directs
Nietzsche's investigation so as to bring more consciousness
to our impulsive forces, comprehending can act only by
exercising a perpetual complicity with our tendencies, good
or bad. However, does it not seem that this illusion is worse
than the one for which Nietzsche reproached Spinoza, when
Spinoza opposed the act of comprehending to the fact of
laughing, crying, and hating? How can an obscure force reach
consciousness as an obscure force ifit does not already belong
to the fulllight of consciousness? As the Apostle said, "All
things that are condemned are made manifest by the light, jor whatever
makes manifest is light."13 How to manifestwithout condemning? How
can an obscure force be made manifest without condemning
itself to be illuminated? Could there not be a light that is not
a condemnation of the shadows? Pathos knows, no doubt,
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but we cannot share in its mode of knowing except through
this condemnation: "Take no part in the unfruitful works of
the shadows," said the Apostle. 14 N evertheless, it is written
that "the light shines in the darkness) hut the darkness did not receive
it. JJ15 The light wanted to be received by the shadows; there is
thus a moment when the light is a condemnation, and there
is a moment when the light seeks to he received by the shadows.
Everything that rises up into the full light of
consciousness rises up upside down-the images of night
are reversed in the mirrar of conscious thought. Later we will
see that there is a necessity deeply inscribed in the law of
being that is explicated as the universal wheel, the image of
eternity-and that the results of this law is the inversion of
night into day, and of sleep into the wakefulness of
consciousness. Conscious thought is constituted only in and
through an ignorance of this law of return. Every conscious
thought looks forward, identifying itself with a goal that it
posits before itself as its own definition. But if conscious
thought tends to invert the images of the night in full day,
this is because, in taking exteriority as a point of departure, it
claims to be speaking, even as it mistranslates an original text
of which it is unaware. As Nietzsche says:
Consciousness does not really belang to man's
individual existence ....The thinking that rises
to consciousness is only a tiny part of ourselves-
the most superficial and warst part-for only
this conscious thinking takes the form of words,
which is to say, signs of communication.. ..The
emergence of our sense impressions into our
own consciousness, the ability to fix them and,
as it were, exhibit them externally, increased
proportionally with the need to communicate
them to others by means of
signs ....Consciousness has developed subtlety
only insofar as this is required by social or herd
utility. Consequently, given the best will in the
world to understand ourselves as individually
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as possible, 'to know ourselves,' each of us
will only succeed in becoming conscious only
of what is not individual but
'average' ....Fundamentally, all our actions are
altogether incomparably personal, unique, and
infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that.
But as soon as we translate them into
consciousness thry no longer seem 10 be. 16
conclude: every coming to consciousness is the result of
an operation of generalization, of falsification, and thus is a
fundamentally ruinous operation.
It is not the opposition of subject and object
that concerns me here: this distinction I leave
to the epistemologists who have become
entangled in the snares of grammar (the
metaphysics of the people). It is even less the
opposition of 'thing-in-itself' and appearance;
for we do now 'know' nearly enough to be
entided to any such distinction. We simply lack
anyorgan for knowledge, for 'truth': we 'know'
(or believe or imagine) just as much as may be
usejul in the interests oE the human herd, the
species; and even what is here called 'utility' is
ultimately also a mere belief, something
imaginary, and perhaps precisely that most
calamitous stupidity of which we shall perish
someday.17
According to this definition, what conscious thought
produces is always only the most utilizable part of ourselves,
because only that part is communicable; what we have of the
most essential part of ourselves will thus remain an
incommunicable and non-utilizable pathos.
By the individual, by the personal, by the most essential
part of ourselves, Nietzsche in no way means what is generally
understood by the term "individualism." We will see, on the
contrary, that the individual and the non-individual will be
linked in an indiscernible unity, which is indicated by this very
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concern for the authentie. But here we eneounter a number
of diffieulties in Nietzsehe.
If conscious thought inevitably betrays what we have
of the most essential part of ourselves, how can this essential
aspeet be communicated to us? How can it be distinguished
from the gregarious and, since the gregarious is always tainted
by the pejorative notion of utility, how will this essential aspeet
of ourselves escape our own utilitarian thought? Will what is
authentie in us be something entirely useless in its integrity,
and thus properly valuable in Nietzsche's sense, such that here
we at last find an apprehension of existence that is sufficient
in itself, a possibility of being both One andAIR
For conscious thought-the so-called gregarious
thought that reveals nothing essential of ourselves, the thought
disqualified by Nietzsche-the greatest distress is to remain
without a goal, for example, the absence of a truth to be
sought for and attained as the supreme goal of conseious
thought. By its nature and by definition, conseious thought in
itself is always projecting itself forward in search of a goal.
On the other hand, the greatest pleasure of our
pathos-the uneonseious life of the impulses, the essential
aspeet of ourselves-is to be without any goal. Inversely, if
the belief in a goal makes eonseiousness happier and proeures
a degree of security for eonseious thought, the effect of this
assignation of an end is feIt (or can be feIt) in our pathos only
as the greatest distress. When Nietzsehe critiques Spinoza, he
means nothing other than this. For although the impulses as
needs are obviously unaware of what consciousness wants,
they nevertheless imagine that of whieh they are themselves
the need. As soon as consciousness posits a goal, the impulses
momentarily lose this image they have of themselves. As
images of themselves, the impulses are alienated from their
own image for the benefit of the goal-of which they are, by
nature, unaware.
If the essential aspeet of ourselves lies in our pathos-
\which is inexpressible or incommunicable by itself-then
fnsofar as it forms the ensemble of our impulsive life, it also
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constitutes an ensemble of needs. But does it not then seek
to satisfy itself in its own dissipation [dpense]?18 And how would
this dissipation effect itself and find satisfaction? When our
deepest need expresses the most essential part of ourselves
in laughter and tears, for example, it would dissipate itself as
laughing and crying, which are in themselves the image of
this need. The laughing and crying would be produced
independently of any motive that conscious thought would
attribute to them, rightly or wrongly, from its goal-oriented
perspective. And being thus dissipated, our most profound
need and the loss of any goal would coincide, for an instant,
with our profound happiness.
Even when we do not know how to share its mode
of understanding, our pathos does not thereby prevent us
from understanding ourselves. For where do such sudden
satisfactions, coupled with the absence of any rational motive,
come from-for instance, when I laugh or cry, seemingly
without reason, before some spectacle such as those offered
by the view of a suddenly-discovered landscape or of tidal
pools at the edge of the ocean? Something is laughing or
crying in us that, by making use of us, is robbing us of ourselves
and concealing us from ourselves; hut which, hy making use
of us, is concealing itself. Does this mean that this something
was not present otherwise than in the tears and laughter? For
if I laugh and cry in this way, I take myself to be expressing
nothing but the immediate vanishing of this unknown motive,
which has found in me neither figure nor sense, apart from
the image of this forest or these waves greedy for buried
treasures. In relation to this unknown motive, which is hidden
from me by these outward images, I am, in Nietzsche's sense,
only a fragment, an enigma to myself, a horrifying chance. And I
will remain afragment, an enigma, and a chance in relation to that
most essential aspect of myself, which speaks through this
laughter and these tears without any rational motive. But this
most essential aspect of myself, which is made manifest in
this way, corresponds to an image hidden in the fulllight of
consciousness, an image that appears to me as inverted and
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that arrives late in the goal-oriented perspective, which wants
to lend as much consciousness as possible to this laughter or
to these tears. Thus there must be a necessity that wills me to
laugh or cry as if I were crying or laughing freely. But is not
this necessity the very same necessity that inverts night into day,
which inverts sleep into the wakefulness where consciousness
posits its goal? Is this not the same necessity that will re-
invert the images of the day into those of night? To live and
to think in the goal-oriented perspective is to distance myself
from what is most essential in me, or from the necessity that
testifies, within me, to my deepest need. To want to recuperate
this most essential part of myself amounts to living backwards
from my consciousness, and therefore I willput all my will and
confidence in the necessity that has made me laugh and cry without any
motive. For the movement that throws consciousness out of
the night and into the dawn, where it posits its goal, is the
same movement that carries n1e far from this goal in order to
lead me back, at deepest midnight, to what I have that is most
essentiaL To suffer trus necessity is one thing; it is quite another
thing to adhere to it as a law; and still another thing to
formulate this law in the image of a circle.
We have seen that the aspiration to truth is given to
us as an impulse, and that this impulse becomes identified
with the function of consciousness. Consequently, to ask
whether the aspiration to truth can be assimilated to pathos
and its errors amounts to asking whether pathos can produce
something that it must still assimilate. Thus, if consciousness
simply pursues this aspiration as its own impulse, by this very
fact that impulse works toward its own ruin in the name of
truth. What is this thing that pursues such an impulsive
aspiration, this thing or this state of things that consciousness
posits, in the fulllight of day, under the name of truth and as
its own end? What is this word "truth" if not the inverted
image of what produced this impulse to truth as a need? To
re-invert this ultimate impulse called the "aspiration to
truth"-this aspiration of the totality of pathos taken
together-to re-invert the image of this aspiration would come
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down to formulating what Nietzsehe states in the following
proposition: "Truth is an error without which a certain species of life
could not live. The value for life is ultimate/y decisive."19 The most
reeent aspiration that has eome to life-this dangerous
aspiration to truth-is l~othingother than the return of pathos
in its totality in the form of a goal.
But here we diseover something disquieting in
Nietzsehe. What did he mean by posing the question of
knowing if truth could endure its incorporation as a condition of life?
What did he mean by saying that the impulsive aspiration to truth
had beeome life-preserving at the same time as the natural errors?
Are not these questions asked from the viewpoint of eonseious
and gregarious thought, that is, in the terms of the very
eonseiousness that neeessarily gives itself a goal? And would
not the terms "error" and "truth," whieh had previously been
emptied of their gregarious meaning, immediately be filled
again with this same eontent?
For the philosopher (or the thinker or the sage in the
Nietzsehean sense), the question is: "What form eould be
given to this experienee so that it eould be taught?" How
eould the will be persuaded to will the opposite of every goal
given by conscious thought, such that the will could strive to
reeuperate its most essential and least eommunieable aspeet?
How eould the will be persuaded to take itself as its own
objeet, thereby produeing an apprehension of existenee
returning to itself just as the will returns to itself? Was it not
neeessary to appeal to eonseious thought, and thus to borrow
from the language of the herd (in this ease, the language of
positivism), and thus to take up onee again the notions of
utility and goal, and direet them toward and against every utility,
toward and against every goal?
In his retrospeetive prefaee to The Gqy Science, dated
1886, we read:
'Incipit tragedia' is written at the end of this
book, with a disquieting easualness-Beware!
Something downright wieked and malieious
is announeed here: incipitparodia.20
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In the first aphorism of The Gay Science, Nietzsche
asks:
What is the meaning of the ever new
appearance of these founders of moralities
and religions ... these teachers of remorse and
religious wars? What is the meaning of these
heroes on this stage? ...It is obvious that these
trageclians, tao, promote the interest of God
or work as God's emissaries. They, tao,
promote the life of the species bypromoting the
faith in lift. 'Life is worth living,' every one of
them shouts; 'there is samething to life, there
is samething behind life, beneath it; bewarel
From time to time this instinct, which is at
work equally in the highest and basest men-
the instinct for the preservation of the
species-erupts as reason and as passion of
the spirit. Then it is surrounded by a
resplendent retinue of reason and tries with
all the force at its command to make us forget
that at bottom it is instinct, drive, folly, lack
of reasons. Life shallbe loved, because-/Man
shall advance himself and his neighbor,
because-I.... In order that what happens
necessarily and always, spontaneously and
without any purpose, may henceforth appear
to be done for same purpase and strike man
as rational and an ultimate commandment, the
ethical teacher comes on the stage, as the
teacher of the purpose of existence; and to
this end he invents a second, different
existence and unhinges by means of his new
mechanies the old, orclinary existence." 21
And Nietzsche cancludes:
Not only laughter and gay wisdom but the
tragic, tao, with all its sublime unreason,
belangs amang the means and necessities of
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the preservation of the species.
Consequently-. Consequently. Consequently.
0, do you understand me, my brothers? Do
you understand trus new law of ebb and flood?
There is a time for us, toO!22
Does this mean that Nietzsehe in turn would like to
enter the stage as a new doctor of the goal of existence? As a
new doctor of morality? Does this mean that, in order to
come to the aid of the most essential aspect of ourselves, we
must inevitably appeal to the rationalizations of conscious
thought and the positing of a goal-even though it is a
question of apprehending an existence without a goal?
Nietzsehe always has a formula that seems to imply an
imperative: the will to power.
Trus entails a serious question: what is Nietzsche's true
language? Is it the language of lived experience, or of
inspiration, or of revelation, or perhaps of the experiment to
be performed, the language of experimentation? Is there not,
in each case, an interference between these various languages,
which intervenes in the desire to legitimate the
incommunicable lived experience of the eternal return by way
of a demonstration? Does not Nietzsehe provide this
demonstration at the level of the scientifically verifiable
cosmos-and on the moral plane, by elaborating an imperative
that can command the will under its relation to the will to
power? Is this not the point where the dubious references to
science and biology intervene, when Nietzsche's fundamental
experience is already being expressed on an entirely different
level by the character of Zarathustra? Perhaps we have here
one of the alternating terms, one of the aspects of Nietzsche's
antinomy: the experience of the eternity of the self at the
ecstatic moment of the eternal return of all things could not
be the object of al1 experimentation any more than it could
be the object of a rationally constructed elucidation; any more
than the lived, inexpressible, and therefore incommunicable
experience could ground an etrucal imperative that would turn
the lived into something willed and rewilled, insofar as the
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universal movement of the eternal return is supposed to lead
the will to will infallibly at the willedmoment. The lived experience
is thus entirely implicit in a contemplation where the will is
completely absorbed in an existence rendered to itself-so
that the will to power is simply an attribute of existence, which
wills itself only insofar as it iso This explains the often doubtful
character of those propositions of Nietzsche's, in the
fragments on the transvaluation of values, that consider will to
power independently of the law of the eternal return,
independently of this revelation from which it is inseparable.
At the level of lived experience, Nietzsche is already surpassed
by his own Zarathustra. Nietzsche is no more than the doctor
of a counter-morality that is seemingly expressed in clear
language, and whose worth comes from this audacious use of
conscious thought for the benefit of that which has no goal.
He is the doctor of a goal for existence, charged with covering
up his own retreat into that region where, in reality, he has
already retired-this immortality from which he has perished,
as he says more than onee, and from which he will return in
delirious transports to show what he is under two different
nan1es: Dionysus and the Crucified.
After the proposition: Truth is a necessary error, we find
this other proposition: Art is a higher value than truth, which is
the conclusion of those propositions which declare that art
prevents usfrom losing ourselves in the truth or artprotects usfrom the
truth. All these propositions have the same pragmatic character
as the preceding proposition: truth is on!J a necessary error3-a
character that holds precisely because everything is being
considered solely from the viewpoint of its usefulness.
Nevertheless, as soon as error creates forms, it goes
without saying that art must effectively beeome that domain
where willed error inaugurates a rule of the game. Just as it is
contradictory to give a practical application of truth as error,
so it appears that, in this domain of the game par excellence
which is art, imposture constitutes a legitimate activity in accord
with the reason of fiction. But art has a very wide meaning,
and in Nietzsche, this category includes institutions as much
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las works of free creation. For example-and here we can see
[mmecliately what is at issue-how does Nietzsche consider
Ithe Church? For him, the Church is constitutedgrosso modo by
a cast of profound impostors: the priests. The Church is a
masterpiece of spiritual domination, and it required that
impossible plebian monk, Luther, to dream of ruining that
masterpiece, the last eclifice of Roman civilization among uso
The admiration Nietzsehe always had for the Church and the
papacy rests precisely upon the idea that truth is an error, and
that art, as willed error, is higher than truth. This is why
Zarathustra confesses his affinity with the priest, and why, in
the Fourth Part, during that extraorclinary gathering of the
different kinds of higher men in Zarathustra's cave, the Pope-
the Last Pope-is one of the prophet's guests of honor.24
This betrays, I think, Nietzsche's temptation to foresee a ruling
class of great meta-p!Jchologists who would take charge of the
destinies of future humanity, since they would know perfectly
both the different aspirations and the different resources
capable of satisfying them. What interests us, however, is a
particular problem that never ceased to preoccupy Nietzsehe:
the problem of the actor. We read in aphorism 361 of The
Gqy 5cience:
Falseness with a good conscience; the delight
in simulation exploding as apower that pushes
aside one's so-called 'character,' flooding it and
at times extinguishing it; the inner craving for
a role and mask, for appearance; an excess of
the capacity for all kinds of adaptations that
can no longer be satisfied in the service of
the most immediate and narrow utility-all
of this is perhaps not only peculiar to the
actor.25
Let us take careful note of everything Nietzsehe is
revealing here: delight in simulation exploding as apower; pushing
aside one} so-called ucharacter," submerging it sometimes to thepoint of
extinguishing it-here we suddenly perceive what was
threatening Nietzsehe himself: first of all, simulation exploding
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as power to the point of submerging or extinguishing one's
so-ealled "eharaeter." The point here is that simulation is not
only a means but also apower--and thus that there is an irruption
of something ineompatible with one's so-ealled "eharaeter,"
a putting into question of what one is in a situation that has
been determined by this same indeterminable. Nietzsehe ealls
this putting into question a surplus of the adaptive faculties, but
this surplus, he remarks, never manages to satisJy itse!/, or to serve
an immediate and strict utiliry. This is why that which is expressed
by thus surplus of the faeulties of adaptation has a role, whieh
is existence itse!f-existenee without a goal, existenee suffieient
unto itselE But let us return, onee again, to the [lIst line:falseness
with agood conscience. Here we eonfront anew the notion of the
willed error. In the rationality of simulaera, it is willed error that
provides an aeeount of that existenee whose very essenee lies
in the truth that eoneeals itself, that refuses itself.
Existence seeks a physiognomy in order to reveal itse!/; the
actor is its medium. What reveals existenee? A possible
physiognomy: perhaps that oE a gode
In another eurious passage from The Gay 5cience
(aphorism 356), entitled "How things will become evermore ~rtistic'
in Europe," Nietzsehe remarks that the need to make a living
eompels almost all Europeans to adopt a partieular role, their
"oeeupation." Some people manage to retain the merely
apparent freedom of ehoosing this role for themselves, while
for most people it is preseribed in advanee. The result is quite
singular: almost everyone identifies themselves with their
role-everyoneforgets at whatpoint chance) disposition) andarbitrariness
were at work in them when the question of their so-ealled
"voeation" was deeided-and how many other roles they
might perhaps have been able to play, although now it is too
late. In a more profound sense) the role has actual!J become characte!;
and art has become nature. Later, the same aphorism diseusses
the question of soeial degradation, but what I would like to
emphasize is this: what is here deseribed as a phenomenon
of eontemporary soeiallife appears in reality as the image of
destiny itself-and of Nietzsehe's destiny in partieular. We
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believe we choose freely to be what we are, but not being
what we are, we are in fact constrained to play a role-and
thus to play the role of what we are outside ourselves. We are
never where we are, but always where we are only the actor of
this other that we are. The role represents the fortuitousness in
the necessity of destiny. We cannot not will, but we can never
will something other than a role. To know this is to play in
good conscience, and to playas weIl as possible amounts to
dissimulating oneself. Thus, to be aprofessor ofphilology at Basel
or even the author of Zarathustra is nothing other than to play
a role. What one dissimulates is the fact that one is nothing
other than existence, and one dissimulates the fact that the
role one plays refers to existence itself.
This problem of the actor in Nietzsehe, and this
irruption of a power in a so-called "character" that threatens
to submerge it to the point of extinguishing it-this problem,
I am saying, is immediately relevant to Nietzsche's own identity,
to the putting in question of this identity considered as
fortuitously received and then taken on as a role-just as the
role someone chooses to play can be rejected as a mask in
favor of another one from among the thousands of masks
of his tory. Having produced this conception from the
valorization of the willed error, the valorization of imposture
as a simulacrum, it now remains to determine to what extent
the simulacrum, if it is an apprehension of existence,
constitutes a manifestation of being in the existent being-a
manifestation of being in the fortuitous existent.
Is existence still capable of a God? asks Heidegger. This
question is asked as much in the biographical context of the
person who formulates it for the first time as a piece of news-
God is dead-as it is asked in the context of the events and the
thought of the contemporary epoche
The day after bis collapse, in Turin, Nietzsche awakens
with the feeling of being both Dionysus and the Crucified,
and he signs the letters he sends to Strindberg, Burckhardt,
and other notable figures with one of these divine names.
Until this point, it had always been a matter of
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opposing Dionysus and the Crucified: "Have I been understood?
Dionysus versus the Crucifted"26 Now that Nietzsche the professor
has Eaded-or rather, now that he has finally abolished all
limits between outside and inside-he declares that the !wo
gods are living together in rum. Let us distance ourselves Erom
all questions oE pathology, and retain trus declaration as a
valid judgment of rus own apprehension oE existence. The
substitution of the divine names for that oE "Nietzsche"
immediately touches upon the problem oE the identity of the
person in relation to a single God, who is the truth, and to the
existence of many gods, insofar as they are the explication oE
being, on the one hand, and an expression oE the plurality
witrun a single individual, witrun each and every individual, on
the other.
Thus Nietzsche maintains witrun rumself the image
of Christ, or rather, as he says, oE the Crucified, a supreme
symbol that remains in rum as the indispensable opposite of
Dionysus. Through their very antagonism, the two names
"Christ" and "Dionysus" constitute an equilibrium.
It is clear that trus brings us back to the problem of
the authentie incommunieable. It is in trus context that I<arl
Löwith, in rus in1portant book on the eternal return, poses
the following question oE credibility to Nietzsche's doctrine:
If he is not Dionysus, does not the whole edifice fall into
ruin?27 But I am elaiming that trus question does not see in
what sense the simulacrum can or cannot give an aceount of
the authentie.
When Nietzsche announces that God is dead, this
amounts to saying that Nietzsche must neeessarily lose rus
own identity. What is presented here as an ontological
catastrophe corresponds exactly to the re-absorption of both
the true world and apparent world into the fable. Witrun the
fable, there is a plurality of norms; or rather, there is no norm
at all properly speaking, beeause the very principle of a
responsible identity is unknown in the fable, insofar as
existence is neither clarified nor revealed in the physiognomy
of a unique God who, as the judge of a responsible self, would
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extract the individual from a potential plurality.
God is dead does not mean that the divinity ceases to
act as a clarification of existence, but rather that the absolute
guarantee of the identity of the responsible self vanishes from
the horizon of Nietzsche's consciousness, which in turn
merges with this disappearance.
Jf the concept of identity vanishes, at first sight all
that remains is the fortuitousness that befalls consciousness.
Up until then, consciousness recognized the fortuitous by
virtue of its apparently necessary identity, which judges that
all things around it are either necessary or fortuitous.
But, as soon as the fortuitous is revealed to
consciousness as the necessary effect of a universal law, as
the wheel of fortune, it can consider itself to be fortuitous.
All that remains for consciousness is to declare that its own
identity is a fortuitous case arbitrarily maintained as necessary,
even if this means understanding itself through this universal
wheel of fortune, and even if this means embracing (if
possible) the totality of cases-fortuitousness itself in its
necessary totality.
What subsists then is being, and the verb "to be" is
never applicable to being itself, but to the fortuitous. In
Nietzsche's declaration, "1 am ChambigeJ 1 am Badinguet; 1 am
Prado...At bottom 1 am every name in history,"28 we can see his
consciousness enumerating, like so many drawings in a lottery,
the differel1t possibilities of being that, taken together, would
be being itself. These different possibilities make use of the
momentary success that is named Nietzsehe, but who, as a
success, winds up abdicating himself for a more generous
demonstration of being. "In the end I would much rather be a
Baselprofessor than God; but I have not daredpush mypersonal egoism
sofar as to desistfor its sakefrom the creation oJ the world. .. One must
make sacriftces however and wherever one lives."29
Existence as the eternal return of all things is produced
in the physiognomies of as many multiple gods as it has
possible manifestations in the souls ofmen. Jf the will adheres
to this perpetual movement of the universe, what i
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contemplates is first the wheel of the gods, as it is said in
Zarathustra: The universe is on!y "many gods eternal!Y fleeing and re-
seeking one anothet; many gods blissfullY se!f-contradictingJ communing
again and belonging again to one another."30
No doubt, the Nietzschean version of polytheism is
necessarily as distant from the devotion of antiquity as his
concept of a divine instinct generating many gods is necessarily
distant from the Christian notion of divinity. But what this
"version" shows is the refusal to settle into an atheistic morality
that, for Nietzsche, was no less suffocating than the
monotheistic morality. He could not help but see in atheistic
and humanistic morality merely the continuation of what he
feIt was the tyranny of a unique truth, whatever its name might
be-whether it appeared in the form of a categorical
imperative or as the physiognomy of an exclusive and personal
God. Thus, the disbelief in a unique and normative God, in a
God who is the Truth, is nonetheless affirmed as an impiery
that is divine/y inspired, which forbids any re-folding of reason
back into strictly human limits. Nietzschean impiety not only
discredits rational man, but remains complicit with all the
phantasms that are reflections in the soul of everything that
n1an has had to expel in order to arrive at a rational definition
of his nature. This impiety, however, does not aspire to a
pure and simple unleashing of blind forces, as some are often
led to say with regard to Nietzsehe. He has nothing in common
with a vitalism that would make a clean slate of all of the
elaborated forms of culture. Nietzsche is at the antipodes of
any naturalism; and his impiety declares itself to be a tributary
of his culture. This is why one finds, in Zarathustra's
incantation, something like an appeal to an insurrection of
images-those images that the human soul is able to form, in
its phantasms, from its own obscure forces. These phantasms
testify to the soul's aptitude for an always-inexhaustible
metamorphosis, its need for an unappeasable and universal
investment, in which various diverse extra-human forms of
existence are offered to the soul as so many possibilities of
being-stone, plant, animal, star-but precisely insofar as they
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would always be possibilities for the life of the soul itself.
This aptitude for metamorphosis (whieh, under the regime
of an exelusive normative prineiple, is one of the major
temptations that man has had to struggle against for millennia
in order to eonquer and define himself) has not itself
eontributed to the eliminatory formation that had to lead to
man. The proof of this ean be found in the delimitation of
the divine and the human, and in that admirable eompensation
by whieh man-to the extent that he renounees his bestiality,
vegetality, and minerality, and hierarehizes his desires and
passions aeeording to always-variable eriteria-reveals within
himself an analogous hierarehy in regions that are supra- or
infra-worldly. The universe is populated by many divinities,
by various divinities of both sexes, and thus divinities that are
eapable of pursuing, fleeing from, and unitingwith eaeh other.
So it was at that moment when the surprising equilibrium of
the world blossomed into myth, when-thanks to the
simulaera of multiple gods, diverse with regard to their gender
and sex31-neither "eonseious" nor "uneonseious," neither
"outside" nor "inside," neither "obseure forees" nor
"phantasms" preoeeupied the mind, onee the entire soul
managed to situate these images in spaee, and to render them
indistinguishable from the soul. Out of this relation between
the divine and the human, moral monotheism has aehieved
the eonquest of man by himself, and has subjugated nature
to man by enabling the anthropologieal phenomenon of
seienee. Moreover, aeeording to Nietzsehe, after two millennia
this relation has provoked that profound disequilibrium whieh
has resulted in the disarray of nihilism. Henee the alienation
of the universe from man, whieh Nietzsehe diseerned in the
exploration of the universe by seienee; and henee the loss of
what is expressed by this nostalgia for the soul (as eapable of
metamorphosis): the fundamental eros that makes man, as
Nietzsehe says, the animalwho reveres.32 What beeomes apparent,
then, is that the event of the "death of God" stirs the eros of
the soul at its root; it awakens the instinet of adoration, this
instinct that generates gods, whieh in Nietzsehe is both a creativ
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will and a will to eternalization.33 The "death of God" means
that a rupture is introduced into this eros, which is then split
into two contrary tendencies: the will to se!f-creation, which is
never without destruction, and the will to adore, which is never
willed without willing eternalization. Insofar as the will topower
is simply another term for this set of tendencies and
constitutes the universal capacity for metamorphosis, it finds
something of a compensation, or a kind of healing, in its
identification with Dionysus, in the sense that, in Nietzsche,
this ancient god of polytheism would express and combine
within hirnself all the dead and resurrected gods.
Zarathustra hirnself accounts for the dissociation of
these two willings (the will to create and the will to adore)
when he demands the creation of new values-and thus new
truths, which man would not know how to either believe or
obey, since they would be marked with the seal of distress
and destruction. It would be impossible for the will to create
new values to ever appease the need to adore, since this need
is implicit in the will to eternalization of oneself. Jf man is an
animal that reveres, he would only know how to revere what
comes to him from the necessity of being-by virtue of which
he cannot not will to be. For this reason, he would not know
how to either obey or believe in the values he deliberately
creates, were it not a matter of the very simulacra of his need
for eternity. Hence the alternation, in Zarathustra, between
the will to create, in the absence of gods, and the contemplation
of the dance oj the gods, which explains the universe. It is when
he announces that all thegods are dead that Zarathustra demands
that what must now live is the overman, that is, a humanity
that knows how to overcome itself. How is it overcome? By
rewilling that everything that already was be reproduced, and
to do this as its own activity. This act is defined as the will to
create: as Zarathustra declares, "if there were god~ what would
there be to create?"34 But what is it that leads man to create if
not. the law of the eternal return, to which he decides to
adhere? To what does he adhere if not a life that he hasforgotten,
but which the revelation of the eternal return as law incites
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hirn to re-will? And what does he re-will if not that which he
now does not want to will? Is this to say that the absence of
gods incites him to create new gods? Or does he want to
prevent the return of those ages when he adored the gods?
In re-willing the gods, does he make man move to a higher
life? But how would this life be a higher life, if it tends toward
that which already was? In other words, how could it be a
higher life if it tends toward astate where it does not want to
create, but would rather adore the gods? Once again, it would
thus seem that the doctrine of the eternal return is conceived
as a simulacrum of a doctrine, whose parodic character gives an
account of hilarity as an attribute of existence-an attribute
that becomes sufficient to itself when laughter bursts from
the ground [jOna] of the whole truth, either because the truth
explodes in the laughter of the gods, or because the gods
themselves die from a mad laughter.
When a god wanted to be the only God, all the other
gods were seized by a mad laughter, to the point where they
died laughing.35
For what is the divine, if not the fact that there are
many gods and not a single God?
Laughter is here like the supreme image, the supreme
manifestation of the divine reabsorbing the announced gods,
and announcing the gods with a new burst of laughter; for if
the gods are dying from this laughter, it is also from this laughter
that bursts from the ground of the whole truth that the gods are
reborn.
We must follow Zarathustra to the end of his
adventure in order to see the refutation of this need to create
for and against necessity, which denounces the solidarity between
the three forces of eternalization, adoration and creation-the
three cardinal virtues in Nietzsche. In this refutation, we can
see that the death of God and the distress of the fundamental
eros, the distress of the need to revere Ca distress that the will
to create turns from in derision as its own failllre), are identical.
For if it is the failure of a single instinct, the derision that
compensates for it is nonetheless inscribed in the necessity
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oE the eternal return. Once he has wiiled the eternal return
oE ail things, Zarathustra has chosen in advance to see his
own doctrine turned Erom in derision, as iE laughtet; that infallible
murderer, were both the best inspirer oE the doctrine as weil as
its best denigrator. Thus the eternal return oj all things also wills the
return oj thegods. What other meaning than trus can be attributed
to the extraorclinary parody oE the Communion, in which
God's murderer is also the person who oEEers the chalice to
the ass: a sacrilegious figure oE the Christian God Erom pagan
times, but more specificaily a sacred animal in the ancient
mysteries, the Golden Ass oE the Isiac36 initiation, an anin1al
worthy oE its tireless "Ia!"37-its tireless yes lets ail things
return-worthy oE representing the long suEEering oE the
divine, worthy also oE incarnating an ancient clivini~Dionysus,
the god oE the vine, resurrected in general drunkenness. Thus,
finaily, as the Wanderer teils Zarathustra: "in the case oj godsJ
death is always a mere prdudice."38
Translated l!J Russell Ford
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